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THE COST OF REGULATORY EXEMPTIONS
C. Steven Bradford-

I. INTRODUCTION

Government regulations, whether they appear in statutes or administrative
rules, often contain exemptions: certain persons or transactions are fully or
partially excused from complying with the regulatory scheme. I Even regulations
without explicit exemptions may be worded in such a way as to implicitly
exempt certain persons. A rule that applies to "all green objects" implicitly
exempts objects of every other color?
'
Economists and legal scholars have written dozens of analyses of the
efficiency of various government regulations3 but, with a few exceptions,4 they
have not paid much attention to exemptions from those regulatory requirements.
The limited economic and legal literature on exemptions focuses on one
particular type of exemption - the small business exemptions which appear in
many U.S. statutes and regulations. s

• Earl Dunlap Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. An earlier
version ofthis article was presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the European Association of
Law and Economics in Athens, Greece on September 19,2002. My thanks to the participants at
that conference, and especially to Carole Billiet, for their thoughtful comments and questions.
I Some exemptions exempt classes of persons or firms.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)
(defining "employer" under the Americans with Disabilities Act to exclude companies with fewer
than 15 employees). Other exemptions exempt particular classes of transactions. See. e.g., 17
C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2003) (exempting issuers from registering securities offerings under the
Securities Act of 1933 if the offering meets certain requirements). The issues discussed in this
paper do not depend on whether the exemption is based on characteristics of the regulated person or
characteristics of the regulated transaction.
The two types of exemptions are discussed
interchangeably in the text.
2 Viewed this way, it is obvious that questions about the substantive design of the regulation shade
into questions of exemption.
3 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis,8 YALE J. REG. 233,261-278 (1991) (summarizing studies of the costs and benefits of
regulation); Steven A. Morrison et at., Fundamental Flaws of Social Regulation: The Case of
Airplane Noise, 42 J.L. & ECON. 723 ( 1999) (cost-benefit analysis of the 1990 Airport Noise and
Capacity Act).
4 See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Does Size Matter? An Economic Analysis of Small Business
Exemptions from Regulation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); C. Steven Bradford,

Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an Unconditional Exemption,
5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. LAW 1 (2001); C. Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the
Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L. J. 591 (1996); see also, e.g., Marc
Linder, The Small-Business Exemption Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: The "Original"
Accumulation ofCapital and the Inversion ofIndustrial Policy, 6 J.L. & POL'y 403 (I998); Peggy
H. Luh, Comment, Payor Don't Play: Background Music and the Small Business Exemption of
Copyright Law, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.REv. 711 (1996).
5 See, e,g., WILLIAM A. BROCK & DAVID S. EVANS, THE ECONOMICS OF SMALL BUSINESS: THEIR
ROLE AND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986); Bradford, Does Size Matter?, supra note 4;
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of
Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 537 (1998). For a review of studies considering the differential
impact of regulation on small businesses, see Henry B. R. Beale & King Lin, U.S. Small Bus.
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The traditional economic case for exemptions is straightforward.
Government regulation is economically efficient only if, considering all possible
regulatory alternatives including no regulation at all, it produces the greatest
possible net benefit. 6 If the cost of government regulation exceeds the benefit,
regulation is inefficient. 7 Even if a regulation produces a net benefit universally
applied, 8 an even greater net benefit might be produced through the use of
exemptions. If the cost of regulating particular firms or transactions exceeds the
benefit of applying the regulation to those same firms or transactions, the net
benefit of the regulation as a whole can be increased by excluding those
negative-net-benefit firms or transactions. 9
The economic case for exemptions is incomplete, however, unless one takes
into account the costs of the exemptions themselves. Regulatory exemptions
involve various types of transaction costs. The cost to the regulator to create the
exemption is an obvious one, but there are other, less obvious transaction costs.
One such cost is specification error. No exemption can be drafted perfectly, so
exemptions will exempt some finns or transactions whose regulation produces a
positive net benefit - the benefit of applying the regulation to the firm or
transaction exceeds the cost. Conversely, exemptions do not exempt all firms
whose regulation produces a negative net benefit - the cost of applying the
Admin., Impacts of Federal Regulations, Paperwork, and Tax Requirements on Small Business,

available at http://www.sba.gov/cduo/research/rsI86tot-pdf(Sept. 10, 1998).
"If society spends its regulatory resources efficiently, it maximizes the net benefits ofregulation."
ROBERT W. HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 46 (2000); see also
EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY
UNREASONABLENESS 6-7 (1982); EDITH STOKEY & RiCHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS 134-158 (1978). Throughout this paper, I use the term "net benefit" to refer to the
difference, positive or negative, between the total benefit of regulation and its total cost: Net
Benefit = Total Benefit - Total Cost. I take no position on the controversial issues of how to value
nonpecuniary costs and benefits or whether some costs and benefits should be weighted more
heavily than others.
7 See, e.g., M.A. UTTON, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATING INDUSTRY16 (1986); Allen R. Ferguson
& Murray 1. Weidenbaum, The Problem of Balancing Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Two
Views, in THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT REGULAnON 153-154 (James F. Gatti ed., 1981).
8 I am not foolish enough to believe that all, or perhaps even most, government regulation produces
a net benefit. See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform.' What Do the Government's Numbers Tell
Us?, in RiSKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 208-253
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (concluding that about half of the final rules studied would not pass a
cost-benefit test, even using the agencies' own numbers). But, if government regulation does
produce a net benefit, what is the case for exempting certain firms and transactions?
9 Obviously, not all exemptions promote economic efficiency.
Some exemptions arise from
jurisdictional limitations. An agency in State A will not usually regulate transactions in State B.
Other exemptions are purely political. Attempts may be made to justifY such exemptions in
economic terms, but they really arise because the regulator has insufficient political power to
impose the regulation on the exempted entities. Of course, some jurisdictional exemptions or
exemptions adopted for reasons of political expediency may be economically efficient as well. My
inquiry is not whether all exemptions promote economic efficiency, but whether there is an
economic efficiency justification for regulatory exemptions in general and, if so, under what
conditions they are efficient.
6
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regulation to the firm or transaction exceeds the benefit. The less precisely
defined the exemption, the greater the error cost. If this definitional imprecision
is too great, what appears in theory to be an efficient exemption may actually
reduce the net benefit of the regulation.
Exemptions also increase enforcement costs. Exemptions create two
classes of firms or transactions, one of which must comply with the regulation
and one of which may not. With an exemption in place, the regulator may no
longer assume that a non-compliant firm is in violation ofthe regulation, making
enforcement more difficult. Exemptions also increase the costs to regulated
firms, who must determine whether or not they are exempt, and encourage those
firms to engage in possibly inefficient strategic behavior to fit within the
exemption and avoid the cost of the regulation. Finally, exemptions impose
information costs on non-regulated third parties who sometimes must distinguish
between regulated and non-regulated firms.
In sum, the conventional analysis of exemptions is incomplete. It is true
that, for an exemption to make economic sense, the cost of regulating the
exempted entities or transactions must exceed the benefit of applying the
regulation to those entities or transactions. But that is only a necessary, not a
sufficient, condition. The cost of the exemption itself must also be taken into
account. An exemption is economically justified only if the cost of regulating the
exempted entities or transactions exceeds the sum of the benefit of applying the
regulation to those entities or transactions and the exemption's transaction costs.

II. THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR EXEMPTIONS

A. The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
A regulation is efficient only if it produces a net benefit - that is, only if
the total benefit produced by the regulation exceeds its total cost. 1O Let TB i be
the total benefit of applying a particular regulatory scheme to a given firm i.
Then, the total benefit of applying the regulatory scheme to all firms is 2::=, TB i ,
where n is the number of regulated firms. Similarly, if TC j is the total cost of
applying a particular regulatory scheme to a given firm i,11 the total cost of
applying the regulatory scheme to all n firms is 2:;=1 TC j • The regulation is a
Kaldor-Hicks improvement l2 over the unregulated world only if 2:;=1 TB j - TC j
>0.

10

See supra note 7.

TC j must, of course, include all of the costs associated with the regulation, not just the regulated
firm's cost to comply with the regulation. Other costs would include the enforcement cost incurred
by the regulator and any costs incurred by third parties as a result of the application of the
regulation to the regulated firm.
12 A change is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if it increases net wealth-in other words, if the
benefits associated with the change exceed the costs. See. e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 77-78 (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-17
(5th ed. J998).
II
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The idea that a regulation's benefits should exceed its costs is relatively
simple but often overlooked. At times, the focus is almost exclusively on benefit,
with little consideration of cost. A state of the world is publicly identified as a
problem and legislation is passed to "solve" the problem, with no or little
mention of the cost of the regulation or whether the "solution" is worth its cost. 13
In other words, the focus is on benefit rather than net benefit: the regulation is
lauded because it produces benefits - that is, L~:I TB j > O.
Over· the past twenty years, the cost of regulation has become a more
important consideration. 14 Benefit and cost are not always explicitly balanced,
but there is at least a recognition that regulation imposing "excessive" costs is
bad. Concern about the cost of "big government" has created a new
governmental sensitivity (or at least a need to appear sensitive) to the costs and
benefits of regulation. ls Claims that the benefits produced by a regulation exceed
its cost are now fairly common.
Economists, of course, recognize that a regulation is not efficient merely
because its benefits exceed its costs. Efficiency requires not just a net benefit,
but the greatest possible net benefit. 16 A regulation that produces a net benefit
should be refined further, if possible, to maximize the net benefit. This economic
insight underlies regulatory exemptions, which attempt to increase the net benefit
of a regulation by excluding firms or transactions whose regulation imposes a net
cost.

13 The latest (and perhaps greatest) example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which will impose
significant new accounting and auditing requirements on American businesses, substantially
increasing the cost of doing business. See, e.g., Thomas G. Donlan, Undermining the Corporation:
The Latest Law in Pursuit ofFraud May Do More Harm Than Good, BARRONS, Aug. 5, 2002, at
35, available at 2002 WL-BARRONS 22178897. At the ceremony to sign the bill, President Bush
congratulated himself and Congress on their successful efforts to restore corporate integrity, with
nary a mention of whether "restoring corporate integrity" was worth the costs imposed by the bill.
See George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, (July 30, 2002),
available at 2002 WL 14547680.
14 Robert W. Hahn, Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 144-45; see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1651, 1655 (2001)
(noting the impending conclusion of the debate in government over the use of cost-benefit analysis,
with a victory in its favor).
15 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, National Primary Drinking Water Regulations:
Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg.
6976, 7045-7046 (Jan. 22, 2001) (arguing, however, that benefits need not exceed costs for a
regulatory standard to be justified); Securities and Exchange Commission, Registration ofBrokerDealers Pursuant to Section 15(b)(11) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934,66 Fed. Reg. 34042,
34048-34050 (June 26, 200 I). See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE LJ. 165, 167 (l999)("[G]ovemment agencies now routinely use" costbenefit analysis).
16 See supra note 7.
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B. The Extent of Regulation
Regulation can vary along two important dimensions: its level and its
coverage. By the level of regulation, I mean the standard applied to regulated
entities - for example, whether to have a .001 p.p.m. or .005 p.p.m. discharge
limitation. By the coverage of regulation, I mean the entities required to comply
with the standard - for example whether all companies must comply or only
manufacturing companies. Level and coverage decisions are the keys to all
regulatory exemptions.
1. The Level of Regulation
Obviously, the level of regulation can vary. Environmental anti-pollution
regulations must choose an allowable discharge level for each particular
pollutant. Employment and safety regulations must choose an appropriate
combination of workplace safety rules. Disclosure regulations must specify the
amount and type of information to be disclosed. Each possible level of
regulation has its own costs and benefits. Often, the benefit of a regulation
increases as the regulation becomes more stringent, but so does the cost. If the
goal is economic efficiency, the regulator must choose the level of regulation that
produces the greatest net benefit - in other words, the level that maximizes
L:, TBi - TC i . where n is the number of regulated firms.!?
2. Coverage

Regulation can also vary in coverage: the set of firms or transactions
required to comply. The regulation may cover the entire population, or it may be
limited to a single industry, a few firms, or even a single firm.
Coverage decisions also affect the efficiency of a regulation. The overall
net benefit of the regulation is maximized by excluding firms or transactions
whose regulation results in a negative net benefit. 18 Assume, for example, that
the net benefit of applying the regulation to all n firms is positive: I~=, TB;TC j > O. But assume further that we can identify a subset of firms (k, I, .. " n) for
TB j whom application of the regulation produces a negative net benefit:
TC j < O. In Figure 1, this would be the subset of firms to the right of the dashed
line.

I:.

17 In making this choice, it must be remembered that no regulation at all, with a baseline net benefit
of 0, is always an option. If all possible regulation produces a negative net benefit compared to the
baseline no-regulation option, the efficient choice is not to regulate.
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Figure 1

•• ••

••••
•• ••

••
•• ••
••

•

The cost of regulating firms to the right of the dashed line exceeds the
benefit produced by their regulation, so the net benefit of the regulation as a
whole is lower when they are included. Exempting that subset of firms (Ie, I, ...,
n) from the regulation and regulating only the remaining firms (I, 2, ... , j) will
increase the overall net benefit of the regulation. Since L;=k TB j - TC j < 0, then
L;:, TB; - TCj > L:, TB j - TC j•
Legislators understand this point on a basic, intuitive level, even if they are
not willing to trade off costs and benefits explicitly. Very few regulatory statutes
apply to the population as a whole. Why not? Because not everyone is
responsible for every problem. Regulating those who have nothing to do with a
problem imposes a cost on those regulated with no offsetting benefit. For
example, law professors are not required to file reports on the pollutants they
discharge because they discharge no pollutants in their work. 19 Applying antipollution regulation to law professors would impose a cost on them with no
corresponding benefit. The regulation is more efficient with their exclusion. 20
Often, regulating a particular firm or transaction will produce some benefit,
but the cost of regulating that firm or transaction exceeds the benefit. The
efficiency argument for excluding those firms or transactions from the coverage
of the regulation is the same, but extending the cost-benefit argument to firms
18 This assumes that there are no transaction costs associated with exempting those firms or
transactions. This assumption will be relaxed later in the article.
19 I will refrain from the obvious joke about law review articles.
20 Persons like this are often excluded not by an express exemption, but by limiting the positive
coverage of the regulation. In other words, instead of a universally applicable regulatory
requirement with an exemption that says "This exemption shall not apply to C and D," the
regulation merely says "A and B shall" do whatever the regulation requires, implicitly excluding C
and D. Except for certain procedural issues that might arise in a proceeding to enforce the
regulation, such as the burden of proof, this is, of course, purely a matter of semantics. Questions
ofcoverage and questions of exemption are merely two sides of the same coin.
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whose regulation produces a non-trivial benefit is often more difficult politicall~.
Politicians and regulators have learned well the lessons of the Ford Pinto case, 1
and are often unwilling to make an explicit, public tradeoff between cost and
benefit. In addition, imposing a regulatory cost on one set of firms within an
industry while exempting competing firms raises cries of unfairness and political
favoritism. It is one thing to exclude law professors from anti-pollution
regulation; it is entirely different politically to exempt one widget manufacturer
when other widget manufacturers must bear the cost of compliance.
3. Tiering: Mixing Level and Coverage Decisions
Decisions about the level and coverage of regulation can be linked,
applying different levels of regulation to different classes of firms or transactions.
This regulatory device, known as tiering,22 can maximize the net benefit of a
regulation by applying to each class the level of regulation (from none to full)
that maximizes the net benefit for that class. 23 For example, Class A might be
completely exempted because no level of regulation produces a positive net
benefit for that class. Class B might be fully regulated because that produces the
greatest net benefit for Class B. And Class C might be subjected to an
intermediate level of regulation because that produces a greater net benefit for the
firms in Class C than either full exemption or full regulation?4

4. Exemptions and Economists
Given the obvious economic argument for exemptions, one might expect to
find considerable economic literature on the subject. But economists have paid
scant attention to exemptions, and almost all of the economic literature focuses
on the exemptions for small businesses that appear in many U.S. regulations. 25 A
number of studies examine whether the costs of regulatory compliance are
proportionally greater for small businesses. 26 A much smaller body of literature

21 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App 1981); see Gary T. Schwartz, The
Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013 (1991) (discussing the case); W. Kip
Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547 (2000) (testing the
adverse public reaction to risk-cost balancing).
22 See United States Regulatory Council, TIERING REGULATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (Mar. 1981).
23 This assumes, of course, that tiering involves no transaction costs. Transaction costs must be
considered in deciding whether a tiered regulatory system is efficient.
24 For a discussion of why tiering makes sense in the context of federal regulation of securities
offerings, see Bradford, Transaction Exemptions, supra note 4, at 618-22.
25 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2) (Hart-Scon-Rodino premerger notification and waiting period
requirements apply only if the acqUired and acquiring companies exceed a size threshold); 29
U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A) (excluding from enterprise coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act
entities with an annual gross volume of business less than $500,000); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)
(defining "employer" under the Americans with Disabilities Act to exclude companies with fewer
than fifteen employees).
26 See, e.g., Beale & Lin, supra note 5, and sources cited therein.
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considers whether this cost difference, if it exists, makes small business
exemptions efficient.27 Almost no attention has been paid to the economic theory
underlying exemptions.
III. THE TRANSACTION COSTS OF EXEMPTIONS
In Section II, 1 explained why exemptions might be efficient, even if a
regulation on the whole produces a net benefit: if, for the exempted firms or
transactions, the total cost of regulation exceeds the benefit, exempting those
firms or transactions may increase the total net benefit of the regulation. But this
analysis is incomplete because it ignores an important set of costs - the
transaction costs associated with the exemptions themselves. Exemptions are not
costless and in deciding whether exemptions are efficient, those costs must be
considered. The costs of exemptions include specification costs, the cost of
strategic behavior, enforcement costs, and third-party information costs. This
section discusses those transaction costs, and the next section explains how those
costs affect the economic efficiency of exemptions.
A. Specification Costs
1. The Cost to Create an Exemption
Exemptions obviously do not appear spontaneously. The legislature or a
regulatory agency must create them, and their creation is not costless. Nor is this
promulgation cost trivial, especially given the expenses associated with the
notice-and-comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),zs
A regulator incurs several different types of costs to produce a regulatory
exemption. First, the regulator must determine the need for an exemption and
whether the costs of the regulation exceed the benefits for certain segments of the
regulated industry. It is difficult enough to estimate regulatory costs and benefits
for the regulated industry as a whole. Obtaining reliable cost-benefit data for
subsets of the regulated industry is even more difficult. After examining the
costs and benefits of applying the regulation to various types of firms and
transactions, if that is possible, the regulator is in a position to decide on the
limits of the exemption(s). At that point, the regulator must draft a rule that
defmes, as accurately as possible, the entities or transactions to be exempted.
The problems associated with an inaccurate delineation of the exemption are
discussed in the next subsection. Once the rule is drafted, the regulator must take
whatever steps are necessary to adopt the rule. If the APA applies, those steps
include publishing the proposed rule and fairly substantial supporting
documentation, waiting for comments on the proposed rule, reviewing and

27

See BROCK & EVANS, supra note 5; Bradford, Does Size Matter? supra note 4; Pierce, supra note

5.
28

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59.
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responding to those comments, making any necessary revisions to the rule, and,
finally, publishing the final rule.29
These are not one-time costs. An exemption is efficient only if, for the
exempted group, the costs of regulation outweigh the benefits. As technology
and individual preferences change over time, the costs and benefits of the rule
also change. Regulation that once was inefficient may become efficient and vice
versa. Therefore, both the regulation and its exemptions must be reevaluated as
.
time passes. 30

2. The Cost of Error: Over- and Under-Inclusiveness
The purpose of exemptions is to free from regulation those transactions or
entities for whom the cost of regulation exceeds the benefit: TC j > TB j •
However, except in the simplest cases exemptions will not be perfect. 31 No
matter how well-crafted the exemption and no matter how careful and vigorous
its enforcement, exemptions will usually be both over- and under-inclusive.
There will be false negatives - exempted firms that should be regulated because
the benefit of applying the regulation to them exceeds the cost: TB j > TC j • And
there will be false positives - firms subject to the regulation that should be
exempted because the cost of applying the regulation to them exceeds the benefit
(TC j > TB j). Table I illustrates the possibilities. We can group the universe of
all entities and transactions into four categories:
1. True positives (TP): Regulated entities for whom regulation is
efficient because the benefit of regulation exceeds the cost: TB j >
TC j •

2. False positives (FP): Regulated entities for whom regulation is
inefficient because the cost of regulation exceeds the benefit: TC j >
TB j •
3. False negatives (FN): Exempted entities for whom regulation is
efficient because the benefit of regulation exceeds the cost: TB j >
TC j •
4. True negatives (TN): Exempted entities for whom regulation is
inefficient because the cost of regulation exceeds the benefit: TC j >
TB j •

29

5 U.S.C. §§ 552-59.
The frequency of reevaluation that is efficient depends on the cost and benefit of reevaluating the
regulation and its exemptions. The benefit of reevaluation, in tum, depends primarily on the
expected rate of change of the costs and benefits of regulation over time.
3\ More precisely, the cost of a perfect separation between exempted and regulated ftrms far
exceeds the gains.
30
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Table 1

Regulated

True Positives

False Positives

Exempted

False Negatives

True Negatives

A perfect exemption would exactly track the dividing line between firms
whose regulation produces a positive net benefit and firms whose regulation
produces a negative net benefit. There would be no false positives or false
negatives, and the exemption would maximize the net benefit of the regulation.
But, in an imperfect world, this result cannot be realized. Assume that the
rectangle in Figure 2 represents the entire universe of entities or transactions that
might be regulated. The dotted line bisecting the box separates those entities
whose regulation would produce a positive net benefit (to the left of the curve)
from those entities whose regulation would produce a negative net benefit (to the
right of the curve).

Figure 2

+•
•+
+•
•+

••
••
••

t•

•• ••

A perfect exemption would track the dotted line perfectly, but that is not
possible. The solid line in Figure 3 represents an imperfect exemption. Firms to
the right of the exemption line are exempted and firms to the left are regulated.
The false positives (regulated entities that should be exempted) fall into the
shaded areas of the figure. The false negatives (exempted entities that should be
regulated) fall into the cross-hatched areas. The total error cost associated with
an imperfect exemption is the sum of the shaded and cross-hatched areas.
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Figure 3

. . . f --_Regulated Exempt

False
positives
TB j < TC j ,

.....
~

'Ii;-/~ False negatives

II

TB j > TC,

but exempted

Narrowing or broadening the exemption can change the amount of each
type of error, but cannot eliminate the error entirely. Ifwe narrow the exemption
to eliminate the false negatives, as shown in Figure 4, there are no false
negatives. The exemption exempts only firms whose regulation produces a
negative net benefit. But the cost of doing this is an increase in the error
associated with false positives (regulated firms that should be exempted), as
represented by the shaded areas in Figure 4.

Figure 4

Regulated

Exempt---·~
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An identical problem results if we broaden the exemption to make it more
inclusive, as shown in Figure 5. This eliminates the false positives; all firms that
should be exempted are exempted. However, it does so only by increasing the
number of false negatives (exempted firms whose regulation would produce a
positive net benefit). This error cost is represented by the cross-hatched area in
Figure 5.

Figure 5

.- Regulated Exempt--------..
~

•• •

•
...
~

/

~

•• ••

••,.

...

...

If, in an imperfect world, the regulators cannot eliminate this specification
error (or cannot eliminate it at a low enough cost), the second-best solution, not
accounting for other possible transaction costs, is to craft the exemption so that
the total of the false positives and the false negatives is minimized. To simplify
the discussion, let the four variables, TP, FP, FN, and TN, equal the total net
benefit associated with each of the four categories - true positives, false
positives, false negatives, and true negatives. TP is the total net benefit
associated with regulating all the true positives: TP = I:, TBj - TCi, where n is
the number of true positives. By definition, TB j > TC j for each of the entities or
transactions in this group, so the total, TP, is positive. FP is the total net benefit
associated with regulating all the false positives: FP = I:, TB j - TC j , where m
is the number of false positives. Since, by definition, TC j > TB j for each of the
entities or transactions in this group, the total, FP, is negative. FN is the total net
benefit that would be obtained by regulating all the false negatives: FN =
I:=, TB j - TC j, where k is the number of false negatives. FN is positive because
TB j > TC j for each of the entities or transactions in this group. Finally, TN is the
total net benefit that would be obtained by regulating all the true negatives: TN =
I{=, TB j - TCi, where j is the number of true negatives. TCj > TB j for each of
the entities or transactions in this group, so the total, TN, is negative.
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The total error cost of an exemption, compared to a hypothetical world of
perfect information, is FN + IFPI. FN is the value lost by exempting from the
regulation entities or transactions whose regulation would produce a net gain.
IFPI is the value lost by not exempting from the regulation entities or transactions
whose regulation produces a net cost. Specification error is not, of course, the
only transaction cost of exemptions, but, if it were, the following rules would
lead to economic efficiency:
1. An exemption should be adopted if ITNI > FN, because the
exemption would increase the net benefit of the regulation. Adopting
the exemption produces both a gain and a loss. The gain produced by
the exemption is ITNI, the cost saved by not regulating firms whose
regulation results in a net loss. The loss produced by the exemption is
FN, the gains foregone by not regulating firms whose regulation
produces a net benefit. If ITNI > FN, the exemption produces a net
benefit. A perfect exemption that costlessly exempted all firms for
which TC j > TB j and regulated all firms for which TB j > TC j (in other
words, an exemption for which TN and FN both equal 0) would be
preferable, but an imperfect exemption is better than no exemption at
all.

2. If FN > ITNI, the exemption is not efficient. The cost of the
exemption (the gains foregone by exempting the false negatives)
exceeds the benefit (the cost saved by exempting the true negatives).
A universally applicable regulation produces a greater net benefit than
the same regulation with this exemption. Of course, it is still possible
that no regulation at all is preferable to a universally applicable
regulation, if the regulation applied universally does not produce a net
benefit. It is irrelevant that, in a world without error, a regulation
which properly segregates firms into regulated and exempted
categories would produce a net benefit.
Since an error-free
regulation/exemption combination is not feasible, the best alternative
is no regulation at all.
3. Exemptions should be designed to maximize ITNI - FN. The
efficient exemption or set of exemptions is the one that produces the
greatest net benefit.

B. The Cost of Strategic Behavior32
Complying with government regulations is often costly, and regulated firms
would prefer to be exempted and avoid some or all of those compliance costs.
They therefore have an economic incentive to modify their behavior to fit within

32

My thanks to my colleague Norm Thorson for raising the issue discussed in this section.
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an exemption if the cost of doing so is less than the cost of complying with the
regulation. 33 This strategic behavior could be inefficient because some of its
costs are external to the firm and therefore will not be considered by a rational
firm in deciding what to do. This inefficiency is another cost of regulatory
exemptions. 34
The problem of strategic behavior is best illustrated by example. Assume
that Acme Corporation is a manufacturer subject to environmental pollution
controls. It costs Acme $10 million to comply with the regulation, but Acme's
compliance reduces pollution costs by $15 million. Applying the regulation to
Acme produces a net benefit of $5 million if, to simplifY the example, we make
the unrealistic assumption that Acme's compliance cost is the only cost of the
regulation. 35
To illustrate the strategic reaction to exemptions, assume that there are two
types of manufacturing plants, "large" and "small", and that Acme operates a
typical large plant. The cost for "small" plants to comply with the pollution
regulation is $9 million and the benefit of compliance is only $8 million, because
small plants pollute less than large plants. The regulator exempts small plants
because small plants' cost of compliance exceeds the benefit by $1 million (TB;
< TC j ).
The exemption appears efficient, but the potential effect of the exemption
on Acme's behavior must be considered. Acme can save money by reducing the
size of its plant so it qualifies for the exemption. Operating a "small" plant
would reduce Acme's business profits, let's say by $6 million, but would save
Acme $10 million in regulatory compliance costs. The net gain to Acme of
reducing its plant size would be $4 million.J6

33 Regulated firms have an incentive to decrease production and divest regulated subsidiaries to
avoid regulation. BROCK & EVANS, supra note 5, at 81, 92; see also Milton Z. Kafoglis, Mandated
Costs: impact on Small Business, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GoVERNMENT MANDATED COSTS, at
119 (Robert F. Lanzilloni ed., 1978) (explaining why regulatory tiering and exemptions may
encourage the growth of small firms); Jay B. Barney et aI., Organizational Responses to Legal
Liability: Employee Exposure to Hazardous Materials, Vertical Integration, and Small Firm
Production, 35 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 328, 342 (1992) (finding a positive association between the
threat of legal liability in an industry and the percentage change in the number of small firms in that
industry).
34 The discussion in this section focuses on exemptions that exempt firms with particular
characteristics, but strategic behavior can also occur with respect to exemptions for particular types
oftransactions. A transaction exemption gives a flfIll an incentive to structure its transactions to fit
within the exemption. If the modified transaction structure is suboptimal for the firm absent the
exemption and if some of the costs of the restructured transaction are external to the finn, the same
problem arises.
35 In other words, we are assuming that the regulator's cost is zero and there are no third-party costs
associated with the regulation.
36 The effect on Acme is actually a little more complicated than this simplified example, as Acme
will undoubtedly incur transition costs downsizing from a large to a small plant. Acme will reduce
the size of its plant only if the present value of the future reduced regulatory cost exceeds the
present value ofthese transition costs.
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This reduction in plant size is profitable to Acme, but economically
inefficient. The social cost of Acme's strategic behavior includes the $10 million
gain due to lower regulatory compliance costs and the $6 million loss from the
relative inefficiency of the smaller plant, but there is an additional cost external
to Acme - the $8 million in additional pollution the small plant produces
because it is not subject to the pollution controls. The net social cost of Acme's
change to a smaller plant is $4 million ($10 - $6 million - $8 million ;; - $4
million). Acme's strategic behavior is inefficient because Acme does not take
into account the external benefit of the regulation - the reduction in pollution.
Other "large" manufacturers would face the same incentives as Acme, and
would engage in the same inefficient strategic behavior. In addition, small
manufacturers who might be considering upgrading to a larger plant due to the
increased operational efficiency (the extra $6 million profit) would not do so
because of the regulatory cost. And new entrants who could profitably operate
large plants would open small plants instead. If an exemption causes inefficient
strategic behavior of this sort, that cost must be considered in evaluating the
exemption's efficiency.

C. Enforcement Costs
Exemptions also create additional enforcement costs. Enforcement is easier
if there are no exemptions. The regulator only has to search for firms not
complying with the regulation; any non-compliance observed by the regulator
violates the regulation. Exemptions, however, make some non-compliance legal,
forcing the regulator to make two determinations: (1) whether a particular firm is
complying with the regulation; and (2) if not, whether the firm is exempted. The
cost of this second determination is a cost of having exemptions.
Distinguishing exempt entities or transactions from regulated entities or
transactions is often difficult. Regulated entities have an incentive to disguise
their behavior so that they appear to qualify for an exemption even when they do
not. l ? The regulator in turn incurs additional costs to discover and prevent any
cheating. 38 One way to discourage cheating is to make the exemptions more
detailed to eliminate any "wiggle" room. But the more complicated the regulator
makes the exemption to prevent unintended finns from benefiting, the greater the
compliance cost for firms to detennine on which side of the uncertain line
between exempted and regulated they fall. These costs are far from trivial, as the
following two examples illustrate.

37 BROCK & EVANS, supra note 5, at 93. From the standpoint of the regulated entity, this strategic
behavior is similar to the strategic behavior discussed in the previous section. The difference is one
of illegality. In the previous case. the entity is modifying its behavior so that it actually qualifies
for the exemption. In this case, the entity is trying to disguise its behavior so that it appears to
qualify for the exemption even though it actually does not.
38 If the cheating is not discovered, the benefits produced by the regulation are less than they
otherwise would be.
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1. An Example: The Regulation of Securities Offerings

Consider first the regulation of securities offerings pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933. The Securities Act imposes filing and disclosure
requirements on companies issuing securities,39 but the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") has adopted several exemptions for relatively small
offerings. 40 Securities Act Rule 505,41 for example, exempts securities offerings
of less than $5 million, subject to certain other conditions.
Since the availability of the exemption turns on the size of the offering, a
difficult enforcement problem arises when a single company engages in multiple
offerings. Assume, for example, that a single company sells $4 million worth of
securities now and $3 million of a similar security two months later. If those two
offerings truly are different offerings, each is less than $5 million and at least one
of them could qualify for the Rule 505 exemption. If, on the other hand, this is
really only a single $7 million offering, that offering is not exempt. A company's
incentive to disguise a single offering as two to obtain the exemption is obvious.
But should the two offerings be treated as one or, to use the SEC's terminology,
should the two offerings be integrated?
To answer that question, the SEC has developed a five-factor test that
focuses on the similarity of the two offerings,42 but the results have been less than
satisfying. The criteria are "nearly impossible to apply"43 and an American Bar
Association subcommittee concluded that the SEC staff s interpretations of the
integration criteria were "difficult to reconcile even when dealing with similar
fact situations involving the same subject matter.'M According to one scholar,
the integration criteria "[engulf securities issuers] in a sea of ambiguity,
uncertainty, and potentialliability.'.45
2. Another Example: Minimum Wage Requirements

See 15 U.S.c. § 77e (2003).
See 17 c.F.R. §§ 230.251(b), 230.504(b)(2), 230.505(b)(2) (2003).
41 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2003).
42 The SEC's five-factor test asks whether,
(1) the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing, (2) the offerings
involve issuance of the same class of security, (3) the offerings are made at or about
the same time, (4) the same type of consideration is to be received, [and] (5) the
offerings are made for the same general purpose.
Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) n
2270-83 (Nov. 6, 1962), al http://www.sec.gov/rules/ll/final/33-4552.htm.
43 Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., The Plight ofSmall Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D: Those
Nagging Problems That Need Atlention, 74 Ky. L.J. 127, 164 (1985-86).
44 Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations, Integration of
Partnership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1605
(1982).
45 Perry E. Wallace Jr., Integration of Securities Offerings: Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain
for Small Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 935, 940 (1988).
39

40
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A second example shows that the SEC's experience is not unique. The Fair
Lahor Standards Act46 imposes minimum wage and overtime pay requirements
on employers. An individual employee is covered by the Fair Labor Standards
Act if the employee himself is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or
producing goods for transportation in interstate or foreign commerce. 47 But,
whether or not an employee is directly involved in interstate or foreign
commerce, he is still covered by the Act if he works for an "enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.'.48 To be covered, an
enterprise must have an annual gross sales of at least $500,000. 49 In other words,
enterprises with gross sales of less than $500,000 are exempted from this type of
coverage.
This exemption gives larger companies an obvious incentive to split a
single, integrated business operation among several legally distinct entities, each
with less than $500,000 of sales, in an attempt to qualify for the exemption. To
protect against this and to limit the exemption to the small companies it was
intended to benefit, the tenn "enterprise" is defined in the Act to mean
the related activities performed (either through unified operation or common
control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and
includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments
or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including
departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but
shall not include the related activities performed for such enterprise by an
independent contractor. 50
This statutory definition has in turn spawned fifteen pages of interpretive
regulations 51 and substantial case law,52 including a constitutional challenge
before the U.S. Supreme Court,53 attempting to determine when entities are
sufficiently related to constitute a single enterprise.

D. Third-Party Information Costs
One of the transaction costs of exemptions is incurred by neither the
regulated firm nor the regulator, but by parties outside the regulatory

46
47

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2003).
29 U.S.c. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (2003).

See

48/d.
49

29 U.S.c. § 203(s)(l)(A)(ii) (2003).
29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(I) (2003).
51 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.201-779.235 (2003).
52 See Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23 F.3d 110, 114-16 (5th Cir. 1994); Dole v. Odd Fellows Home
Endowment Bd., 912 F.2d 689,692-95 (4th Cir. 1990); Brock v. Best Western Sundown Motel.
Inc., 883 F.2d 51, 52-53 (8th Cir. 1989); Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966,969-71 (5th
Cir. 1984).
53 See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976).
50
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relationship. Third parties sometimes need to know if a firm is subject to a
regulation. If all the firms in an industry are regulated, with no exemptions, third
parties incur no cost in making this determination. However, if some firms are
exempted, third parties sometimes must incur an information cost to determine if
a particular firm is regulated or exempted.
Information costs of this sort most commonly arise when the regulation is
intended to protect parties dealing with regulated firms. Assume, for example,
that the Consumer Product Safety Commission adopts a regulation requiring all
children's toys to comply with certain safety requirements. If no toy-making
firms are exempted from these requirements, a toy buyer may assume the toy he
is purchasing meets the safety requirements. The toy buyer does not need to
examine the toy to determine if it is safe.54 If some toy manufacturers are
exempted, the consumer has a more difficult task. Some of the toys available
may not comply with the safety regulations. Before buying a toy, a consumer
must determine if the toy he wishes to purchase is manufactured by a regulated
firm or by an exempted firm, so he can determine if further safety examination is
necessary. If it is not easy to determine whether a particular manufacturing firm
is regulated, the buyer may (1) not buy a toy at all; (2) fully inspect all toys,
including regulated toys; or (3) inspect no toys and just bear the risk that the toy
is unsafe. The option chosen depends on their relative costs, but no matter which
choice the toy buyer makes, the exemption has imposed an additional cost on the
buyer. 55
Third-party information costs of this sort usually arise only where the third
party deals directly or indirectly with the regulated finn. Others do not usually
need to distinguish between regulated and exempted finns. For example, third
parties do not ordinarily need to know whether a given firm is subject to
pollution controls, even if the third parties benefit from the controls. Knowing
whether a finn is regulated or exempted will not affect the third party's behavior.
However, third party infonnation costs can sometimes arise even in
noncontractual settings like this. Consider, for example, an individual deciding
whether to buy a house near a manufacturing plant with a smokestack. The value
of the house depends on the pollutants the plant is emitting, and that in turn
depends on whether the plant is subject to pollution controls. If, as is probably
the case, a home buyer cannot easily determine the amount of pollutants by direct
observation, she needs to know whether the plant is regulated or exempted. The

More accurately, if the regulation is adequately policed, the cost to examine the toy outweighs
the risk that the toy does not comply with the safety requirements.
55 The costs maybe allocated to the sellers if the risk of encountering unregulated toys reduces
what the buyer is willing to pay for toys generally. This problem of distinguishing regulated and
unregulated flnns is an application of Akerlofs problem of the lemons. See George A. Akerlof,
The Marketfor "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488
(1970). Regulatory measures, such as requiring toys to be labeled as regulated or exempt, can
solve this problem. See, e.g., 17 C.P.R. § 230.502(d) (exemptions from Securities Act registration
requirements for securities offerings requiring disclosure to purchasers that the securities purchased
have not been registered). However, such solutions themselves have a cost, so the cost of having
the exemption is not eliminated.
54
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plant's exemption status affects the amount of pollutants, which in tum affects
the value of the home. 56
IV. THE MODIFIED CASE FOR EXEMPTIONS
The discussion in Section III shows that the traditional argument for
exemptions is incomplete. The traditional argument is that firms or transactions
should be exempted if the cost of regulating them exceeds the benefit, or if, for
the exempted group, L;~, TB j < TC j • This is a necessary condition for an
efficient exemption, but it is not a sufficient condition, because one must also
take into account the cost of the exemption itself - the transaction costs
discussed in Section III. A regulatory exemption increases the net benefit of the
regulation by exempting firms whose regulation produces a negative net benefit.
The amount of that gain is L:~, TC - TB j , where n is the number of exempted
firms or transactions. However, a regulatory exemption also reduces the net
benefit of the regulation by the amount of the increased transaction costs
associated with having the exemption. The exemption is efficient only if the
gains it produces exceed these transaction costs.
To determine the gains associated with an exemption, we must first account
for the problem of specification error. The gain is not the benefit a perfect
exemption might produce in theory, but the actual gain in the real world of false
positives and false negatives. When we compute L;~, TC j - TB; for the n
exempted firms, the n firms are not the firms we would in a perfect world like to
exempt, but the firms that actually do slip through the exemption. H the
specification error is great enough that the false negatives excused by the
exemption dominate the true negatives, we need go no further: the exemption is
uneconomic because L;~, TC j - TB j < O.
Even if, after considering the false negatives and our inability to exempt the
false positives, the exemption produces regulatory gains, one must still account
for all the other transaction costs discussed in Section III: specification costs, the
cost of strategic behavior, enforcement costs, and third-party information costs.
An exemption provides a net benefit only if, for the n exempted firms or
transactions,

where S = specification costs,
B =the cost of strategic behavior,
I =third-party information costs, and
E = enforcement costs.
The efficient set of exemptions is the set that maximizes this sum, adding the
greatest possible value to the regulation.

In an efficient housing market, the home's market price will be affected by the plant's status, but
the market requires infonnation to make that adjustment, so someone still incurs the infonnation
cost.

56
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Actually calculating these numbers is not easy or course or, in most cases,
even feasible. One cannot accurately calculate many of these costs. But this
equation nevertheless can inform policy decisions concerning regulatory
exemptions. An exemption is not economically justified unless we account for
the transaction costs of the exemption itself.

v.

CONCLUSION

The traditional assumption that an exemption is justified if the cost of
regulating the exempted group exceeds the benefit is incorrect. The case for
regulatory exemptions is more complicated. The traditional view provides only a
necessary, not a sufficient, condition for exemptions. The transaction costs of
exemptions, such as specification costs, strategic behavior, enforcement costs,
and any third-part information costs, must also be considered. A regulatory
exemption is economically efficient only if the cost to regulate the exempted
firms exceeds the sum of the benefit of regulating the exempted firms and the
transaction costs of the exemption.

